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What Happens at a  
Bail Hearing Anyway? 
The Supreme Court’s Troubling 
Retreat from the Openness Principle 
in Toronto Star v. Canada 
Paul Schabas∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2005, in Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario,1 a unanimous 
Supreme Court struck down a temporary sealing order on an Information 
to obtain a search warrant. Speaking through Fish J. the Court began its 
judgment with these blunt words: “In any constitutional climate, the 
administration of justice thrives on exposure to light — and withers 
under a cloud of secrecy.”2 The Court’s decision followed “more than 
two decades of unwavering decisions” that have affirmed the openness 
principle — from the seminal pre-Charter decision of Dickson J. in Nova 
Scotia (Attorney General) v. MacIntyre,3 to the recognition that openness 
is a component of freedom of expression in section 2(b) of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms4 in Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. 
New Brunswick (Attorney General)5 and in Edmonton Journal, where 
Cory J. emphasized the need for courts to operate in “the penetrating 
                                                                                                             
∗  Partner, Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP, Toronto. The author was counsel for The Toron-
to Star on the cases referred to in this paper. Max Shapiro and Alyssa Manji, students at Blakes, 
provided invaluable assistance in preparing this paper.  
1  [2005] S.C.J. No. 41, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Toronto Star v. Ontario”]. 
2  Id., at para. 1. 
3  [1982] S.C.J. No. 1, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “MacIntyre”].  
4  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, 
c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
5  [1996] S.C.J. No. 38, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “CBC v. New Brunswick”]. 
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light of public scrutiny”,6 to Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.7 
and R. v. Mentuck,8 which established a high test for any discretionary 
limit on the public’s right to know what happens in courts. 
In light of this long line of decisions, and 15 years of repeatedly con-
firming and strengthening the principles established in Dagenais, it 
might have been expected that the Supreme Court would have difficulty 
upholding statutory mandatory bans, such as that found in section 517 of 
the Criminal Code.9 It provides that when an accused requests a publica-
tion ban at a bail hearing, it must be ordered and the public is automati-
cally denied the right to know virtually everything about the hearing — 
“… the evidence taken, the information given or the representations 
made and the reasons, if any, given …”.10 Only whether the accused has 
been released and, if so, on what terms, can be reported, regardless of 
whether the ban is necessary to protect fair trial interests, or for any other 
reason. Although a ban is discretionary if requested by the Crown, the 
effect of section 517 has meant that, in practice, the public knows little, if 
anything, about what happens at a bail hearing. 
However, when the validity of section 517 came before the Court 
recently, eight of the nine judges had little difficulty upholding the 
provision.11 In what must be seen as a retreat from its holdings on the 
importance of openness, the Court gave little weight to its previously 
stated requirements that the public’s right to know should only be limited 
where it is “necessary”, based on concerns that are “well grounded” in 
evidence, and that such limits cannot be justified on the basis of “re-
mote” or “speculative” concerns.12 
This paper reviews the history of the openness principle, including 
the “more than two decades of unwavering decisions” of the Supreme 
Court favouring openness.13 It then discusses the recent decision uphold-
                                                                                                             
6  Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 124, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 
1326, at para. 9 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Edmonton Journal”].  
7  [1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dagenais”]. 
8  [2001] S.C.J. No. 73, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mentuck”]. 
9  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
10  Id., s. 517. 
11  Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, [2010] S.C.J. No. 21, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 721 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Toronto Star v. Canada – SCC”]. 
12  Dagenais, supra, note 7, at 880; Mentuck, supra, note 8, at paras. 32, 34. 
13  Toronto Star v. Ontario, supra, note 1, at para. 30. 
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ing section 517 in Toronto Star v. Canada – SCC,14 and the difficulty in 
reconciling it with the Court’s other decisions in this area. Although the 
case may, arguably, be limited to the context of statutory, mandatory 
bans, the Court’s approach is a troubling departure from its previous 
decisions that looked skeptically at assertions of trial unfairness and 
other claims of prejudice to parties arising from openness. 
II. THE HISTORY OF THE OPEN COURT PRINCIPLE 
The openness principle is at least as old as the common law. It was a 
critical element of the development of the English justice system, as 
judges travelled to towns in England to conduct public trials before the 
community. In the 17th century, Charles I’s use of the Star Chamber, 
which operated in private, was a source of complaint in the years leading 
to the English Civil War. Openness, however, was not seen merely as a 
way of scrutinizing the judges, but was also regarded as a key component 
of finding the truth: “Blackstone stressed that the open examination of 
witnesses ‘in the presence of all mankind’ was more conducive to 
ascertaining the truth than secret examinations.”15 Wigmore too recog-
nized the role of openness in improving “the quality of testimony”.16 
Equally important, is that an open trial ensures that the parties, including 
the judge and jury, conduct themselves properly. It serves a valuable 
educational function by informing the public of what goes on in courts 
and fostering public confidence in them. Bentham put it eloquently in his 
well-known “darkness of secrecy” passage: “Publicity is the very soul of 
justice. It is the keenest spur to exertion and the surest of all guards 
against improbity. It keeps the judge himself while trying under trial.”17 
The openness principle has been repeatedly confirmed in the case 
law. Lord Shaw, in Scott v. Scott,18 referred to Bentham’s famous passage 
in holding that family court matters must be public. Lord Halsbury stated 
                                                                                                             
14  Supra, note 11. 
15  See Edmonton Journal, supra, note 6, at para. 55, per Wilson J., citing Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 3 (1768), c. 23, at 373. For a detailed review of the 
history of openness, dating even back to Roman times, see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 
448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
16  Edmonton Journal, id., at para. 55. 
17  Cited by Dickson J. in MacIntyre, supra, note 3, at 183. 
18  [1913] A.C. 417, at 477 (H.L.). 
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bluntly that “every court of justice is open to every subject of the 
King”.19 And Lord Blanesburgh stated subsequently, in McPherson v. 
McPherson, that “publicity is the authentic hall-mark of judicial as 
distinct from administrative procedure ...”.20 
In his seminal pre-Charter decision on openness, Dickson J. in Mac-
Intyre held that Informations to obtain search warrants must be subject to 
public scrutiny once the warrant has been executed, observing that 
“covertness is the exception and openness the rule. Public confidence in 
the integrity of the court system and understanding of the administration 
of justice are thereby fostered”.21 
Justice Dickson went on to state that “[a]s a general rule the sensi-
bilities of the individuals involved are no basis for exclusion of the 
public from judicial proceedings,” noting that “[a]t every stage the rule 
should be one of public accessibility and concomitant judicial account-
ability.”22  
Post-Charter, the openness principle has been recognized as a com-
ponent of freedom of expression protected by section 2(b) of the Charter. 
In Edmonton Journal,23 the Court declared invalid legislation that 
restricted the ability of the press to report on details of matrimonial 
proceedings. Following MacIntyre, Cory J. (who wrote the principal 
judgment concurred in by Dickson C.J.C. and Lamer J.), emphasized that  
[t]he more complex society becomes, the more important becomes the 
function of the courts. As a result of their significance, the courts must 
be open to public scrutiny and to public criticism of their operation by 
the public ... The press must be free to comment upon court 
proceedings to ensure that the courts are, in fact, seen by all to operate 
openly in the penetrating light of public scrutiny.24 
Edmonton Journal25 elaborated on the holding of the Supreme Court 
in Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General),26 that freedom of expression 
                                                                                                             
19  Id., at 440. 
20  [1936] A.C. 177, at 200-202 (P.C.). 
21  MacIntyre, supra, note 3, at 185. 
22  MacIntyre, id., at 185-86. It is interesting to note that Dickson J. referred with approval to 
a much earlier decision of the Court of Duff J. (as he then was) in Gazette Printing Co. v. Shallow, 
[1909] S.C.J. No. 7, 41 S.C.R. 339, at 359 (S.C.C.), in which the Court upheld the openness 
principle over a century ago. 
23  Supra, note 6. 
24  Edmonton Journal, supra, note 6, at paras. 5, 9. 
25  Id., at para. 10. 
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“protects listeners as well as speakers”, noting that “[t]hose who cannot 
attend rely in large measure upon the press to inform them about court 
proceedings — the nature of the evidence that was called, the arguments 
presented, the comments made by the trial judge — in order to know not 
only what rights they may have, but how their problems might be dealt 
with in court.” As Cory J. continued:  
It is only through the press that most individuals can really learn of 
what is transpiring in the courts. They as “listeners” or readers have a 
right to receive this information. Only then can they make an 
assessment of the institution. Discussion of court cases and constructive 
criticism of court proceedings is dependent upon the receipt by the 
public of information as to what transpired in court. Practically 
speaking, this information can only be obtained from the newspapers or 
other media.27  
Following Edmonton Journal, in CBC v. New Brunswick, a unani-
mous Court recognized the constitutional aspect of openness. There, La 
Forest J. stated: 
That the right of the public to information relating to court proceedings, 
and the corollary right to put forward opinions pertaining to the courts, 
depend on the freedom of the press to transmit this information is 
fundamental to an understanding of the importance of that freedom. 
The full and fair discussion of public institutions, which is vital to any 
democracy, is the raison d’être of the s. 2(b) guarantees. Debate in the 
public domain is predicated on an informed public, which is in turn 
reliant upon a free and vigorous press. The public’s entitlement to be 
informed imposes on the media the responsibility to inform fairly and 
accurately. This responsibility is especially grave given that the 
freedom of the press is, and must be, largely unfettered.28 
In CBC v. New Brunswick, the public broadcaster challenged section 
486 of the Criminal Code, which makes openness subject to a number of 
exceptions, including the need to exclude the public where necessary for 
the “proper administration of justice”. Here, the Court found that a trial 
judge had not been justified in excluding the public from a sentencing 
hearing in a sexual assault matter, but nevertheless upheld section 486 
                                                                                                             
26  [1988] S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, at 767 (S.C.C.). 
27  Edmonton Journal, supra, note 6, at para. 10. 
28  CBC v. New Brunswick, supra, note 5, at para. 23 (emphasis added). 
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because it contained a valid objective and could be narrowly applied 
through proper exercise of judicial discretion. The Court relied on the 
principles enunciated in Dagenais,29 directing trial judges to consider 
alternatives to closing the courts in order to ensure that any restriction on 
public access is “limited as much as possible”, by balancing the compet-
ing interests.30 
III. DISCRETIONARY BANS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
DAGENAIS/MENTUCK TEST 
Dagenais is perhaps the most important Charter case on the openness 
principle. It arose from a ban imposed by courts in Ontario on the 
broadcast of a docudrama, The Boys of St. Vincent, dealing with abuse of 
boys by priests based loosely on the events disclosed in the Mount 
Cashel Inquiry,31 because trials of priests on sexual abuse charges dealing 
with similar facts were ongoing or imminent in Ontario. The Supreme 
Court overturned the bans, and in doing so discarded what it described as 
“[t]he pre-Charter common law rule governing publication bans [which] 
emphasized the right to a fair trial over the free expression interests of 
those affected by the ban.” Chief Justice Lamer held, for the majority, as 
follows: 
In my view, the balance this rule strikes is inconsistent with the 
principles of the Charter, and in particular, the equal status given by 
the Charter to ss. 2(b) and 11(d). It would be inappropriate for the 
courts to continue to apply a common law rule that automatically 
favoured the rights protected by s. 11(d) over those protected by s. 2(b). 
A hierarchical approach to rights, which places some over others, must 
be avoided, both when interpreting the Charter and when developing 
the common law. When the protected rights of two individuals come 
into conflict, as can occur in the case of publication bans, Charter 
principles require a balance to be achieved that fully respects the 
importance of both sets of rights.32 
                                                                                                             
29  Dagenais, supra, note 7. 
30  See CBC v. New Brunswick, supra, note 5, at para. 61. 
31  See, e.g., R. v. Kenny, [1991] N.J. No. 253, 68 C.C.C. (3d) 36 (Nfld. T.D.) [hereinafter 
“Kenny”]. 
32  Dagenais, supra, note 7, at para. 72 (emphasis added). 
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Chief Justice Lamer went on to formulate the rule for when publica-
tion bans should be ordered, as follows: 
A publication ban should only be ordered when:  
(a)  Such a ban is necessary in order to prevent a real and substantial 
risk to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably available 
alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and  
(b)  The salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious 
effects to the free expression of those affected by the ban.33 
In Dagenais, Lamer C.J.C. emphasized that bans should only be or-
dered to “prevent real and substantial risks of trial unfairness — publica-
tion bans are not available as protection against remote and speculative 
dangers”.34 He emphasized the strength of the jury system, and noted that 
alternative measures to bans “readily came to mind”, including “adjourn-
ing trials, changing venues, sequestering jurors, allowing challenges for 
cause and voir dires during jury selection, and providing strong judicial 
direction to the jury”.35 
Dagenais dealt with the balancing of the openness principle against 
risk to fair trial interests. However, the Court has taken Dagenais further. 
In Mentuck,36 the Court modified the Dagenais test to apply to other 
discretionary bans, such as protecting the proper administration of 
justice. There, the Crown had sought a ban on specific undercover police 
techniques — including the now well-known “crime boss” scenario. In 
rejecting the ban, Iacobucci J. modified the Dagenais test as follows: 
A publication ban should only be ordered when: 
(a)  such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the 
proper administration of justice because reasonably alternative 
measures will not prevent the risk; and 
(b)  the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious 
effects on the rights and interests of the parties and the public, 
including the effects on the right to free expression, the right of the 
                                                                                                             
33  Id., at para. 73 (emphasis in original). 
34  Id., at para. 76 (emphasis in original). 
35  Id., at para. 79. 
36  Mentuck, supra, note 8. 
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accused to a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of the 
administration of justice.37 
In addition, the Court gave further guidance and strength to what has 
now become known as the “Dagenais/Mentuck test”, emphasizing that 
for the “real and substantial” risk test to be met: “it must be a risk the 
reality of which is well-grounded in the evidence”. Justice Iacobucci 
continued: “It must also be a risk that poses a serious threat to the proper 
administration of justice. In other words, it is a serious danger sought to 
be avoided that is required, not a substantial benefit or advantage to the 
administration of justice sought to be obtained.”38  
Indeed, Iacobucci J. made even clearer the importance of openness 
and the heavy burden on a party seeking to justify a ban in the following 
passage: 
It is precisely because the presumption that courts should be open and 
reporting of their proceedings should be uncensored is so strong and so 
highly valued in our society that the judge must have a convincing 
evidentiary basis for issuing a ban. Effective investigation and evidence 
gathering, while important in its own right, should not be regarded as 
weakening the strong presumptive public interest, which may go 
unargued by counsel more frequently as the number of applications for 
publication bans increases, in a transparent court system and in 
generally unrestricted speech on matters of such public importance as 
the administration of justice.39 
The Dagenais/Mentuck principles are not just reserved to criminal 
law. In Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance),40 the 
Supreme Court modified the Dagenais/Mentuck test to also apply to 
place the same heavy burden on parties seeking to limit public access to, 
and reporting of, civil litigation where commercial interests might 
otherwise prefer confidentiality. In Sierra Club, the Court articulated the 
test as follows:  
                                                                                                             
37  Id., at para. 32. 
38  Id., at para. 34 (emphasis added). Subsequently, in Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. 
Ontario, [2003] O.J. No. 4006, 67 O.R. (3d) 577, at para. 27 (Ont. C.A.), Doherty J.A. put this 
principle more bluntly: “Fundamental freedoms, like the freedom of expression and freedom of the 
press, cannot, however, be sacrificed to give the police a ‘leg up’ on an investigation.” 
39  Mentuck, supra, note 8, at para. 39. 
40  [2002] S.C.J. No. 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.). 
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A confidentiality order under Rule 151 [of the Federal Court Rules, 
1998] should only be granted when: 
(a)  such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an 
important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context 
of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not 
prevent the risk; and 
(b)  the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the 
effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its 
deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free 
expression, which in this context includes the public interest in 
open and accessible court proceedings.41 
The Court emphasized that a “commercial interest” sufficient to meet 
the test must be one which can be expressed in terms of a public interest 
in protecting the commercial interest. Thus, the commercial interest that 
is sought to be protected must transcend the parties.42  
The Dagenais/Mentuck test has been repeatedly applied over the past 
15 years. It is regarded as a “flexible and contextual test” that applies to 
all exercises of judicial discretion that have the effect of limiting freedom 
of expression and the public’s right to know what happens in courts.43 In 
2005, in Toronto Star v. Ontario, the Supreme Court strongly confirmed 
the Dagenais/Mentuck test in striking down a temporary sealing order on 
search warrant materials. As Fish J. stated in response to the Crown’s 
argument that the test should not apply: “This argument is doomed to 
failure by more than two decades of unwavering decisions in this Court: 
the Dagenais/Mentuck test has repeatedly and consistently been applied 
to all discretionary judicial orders limiting the openness of judicial 
proceedings.”44 
                                                                                                             
41  Id., at para. 53. 
42  Id., at para. 55, where Iacobucci J. endorsed the words of Binnie J. in Re N. (F.), [2000] 
S.C.J. No. 34, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, at para. 10 (S.C.C.): “the open court rule only yields ‘where the 
public interest in confidentiality outweighs the public interest in openness’” (emphasis added). 
43  Supra, note 1, at para. 31. 
44  Id., at para. 30. 
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IV. STATUTORY BANS 
The Dagenais/Mentuck/Sierra Club test applies to discretionary 
bans. However, it is a direct application of the openness principle 
protected by section 2(b) of the Charter. Further, the Court recognized in 
Mentuck that the Dagenais test “incorporates the essence of section 1 of 
the Charter and the Oakes test”.45 Indeed, in CBC v. New Brunswick, in 
upholding the validity of section 486(1) of the Criminal Code (which 
permits limits on public access in the interests of “the proper administra-
tion of justice”), the Court found section 1 applied by considering the 
same factors found in Dagenais and Mentuck. Because the section 
granted the judge discretion, which must be exercised by considering 
whether the limitation was necessary, having regard to the availability of 
“reasonable and effective alternatives”, “whether the order is limited as 
much as possible”, and to “weigh the importance of the ... particular 
order and its probable effects against the importance of openness and the 
particular expression that will be limited in order to ensure that the 
positive and negative effects of the order are proportionate”, the provi-
sion was found to be valid.46 
In light of these “unwavering decisions”, the validity of mandatory 
bans to protect fair trial interests has been in doubt at least since Dagen-
ais.47 Two such bans are regularly ordered in criminal proceedings: bans 
on bail hearings and bans on preliminary inquiries, provided in sections 
517 and 539, respectively, of the Criminal Code. The provisions are 
similar in their terms, directing that a ban shall be ordered if requested by 
the accused, but only may be ordered if requested by the Crown. While 
the ban at a preliminary inquiry only applies to “the evidence taken at the 
inquiry”, the ban at a bail hearing is broader, applying to “the evidence 
taken, the information given or the representations made and the reasons, 
if any, given or to be given by the justice”. Both bans, once imposed, 
continue until the accused is either discharged or the trial is concluded. 
Both sections make it a criminal offence to breach the ban.48 
                                                                                                             
45  Mentuck, supra, note 8, at para. 27. 
46  Id., at para. 25; CBC v. New Brunswick, supra, note 5, at para. 69. 
47  Supra, note 7. 
48  The terms of Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 517(1) are as follows:  
 (1) If the prosecutor or the accused intends to show cause under section 515, he or 
she shall so state to the justice and the justice may, and shall on application by the  
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These provisions effectively give an accused the right to override the 
public’s right to know, regardless of what evidence or submissions may 
be made at the bail hearing or preliminary inquiry, and regardless of 
whether a jury trial is likely, or even possible. In practice, the sections are 
routinely invoked and, as a result, the public knows little of, and rarely 
hears about, what occurs at a bail hearing or preliminary inquiry. 
V. HISTORY OF THE STATUTORY BANS 
Statutory publication bans on bail hearings were first introduced as 
part of the Bail Reform Act of 1972, which strengthened protections for 
those charged with criminal offences, such as shifting the burden to the 
State to justify detention, on limited and specific grounds.49 What is now 
section 517 originally only permitted discretionary bans, however, and 
seems to have passed without discussion or attention in Parliament. In 
1976, the provision was amended to make bans mandatory when re-
quested by the accused. Again, there was no substantive discussion of 
this section in Parliament.50  
There was no historical justification for the mandatory ban when it 
was introduced. Professor Friedland, whose book Detention Before Trial 
led to the Bail Reform Act, did not address the issue.51 Until 1972, all bail 
                                                                                                             
accused, before or at any time during the course of the proceedings under that section, 
make an order directing that the evidence taken, the information given or the representa-
tions made and the reasons, if any, given or to be given by the justice shall not be pub-
lished in any document, or broadcast or transmitted in any way before such time as 
(a)  if a preliminary inquiry is held, the accused in respect of whom the proceedings 
are held is discharged; or 
(b) if the accused in respect of whom the proceedings are held is tried or ordered to 
stand trial, the trial is ended.  
49  Prior to 1972, bail was determined under An Act Respecting the Duties of the Justice of 
the Peace, Out of Sessions in Relation to Respondents Charged with Indictable Offences, S.C. 1869, 
c. 30; R. v. Rae, [1914] O.J. No. 113, 23 C.C.C. 266 (Ont. H.C.). 
50  An explanatory footnote to the original bill states only that the amendment is “in part” con-
sequential to other amendments, these include shifting the onus to the accused to justify release for 
certain offences and broadening the scope of the secondary ground. See Explanatory Notes to Bill C-71, 
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1975, 1st Sess., 20th Parl., 1975, cls. 47-48; Bail Reform Act, S.C. 1970-
71-72, c. 37, s. 5, at para. 457.2; Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1975, S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 93, s. 48; 
Gary T. Trotter, The Law of Bail in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1999), at 2-13. 
51  Friedland, Detention Before Trial: A Study of Criminal Cases Tried in the Toronto Magi-
strates’ Courts (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965) [hereinafter “Friedland”]. 
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hearings and preliminary inquiries were open to the public and to 
publicity, other than reporting confessions or admissions.52  
Interestingly, in 1987, the Law Reform Commission of Canada rec-
ommended that the provisions requiring mandatory bans be abolished, 
but there was no response from Parliament.53  
In the early days of the Charter, section 517 was the subject of a con-
stitutional challenge in Global Communications Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney 
General).54 In a decision rendered before the Oakes test was developed, 
and long before the pre-Charter common law rule was reformulated in 
Dagenais, the Ontario Court of Appeal had little difficulty in upholding 
section 517 on the basis of protection of fair trial interests by preventing 
supposed prejudice to potential jurors. Section 539, dealing with the ban 
                                                                                                             
52  Hon. J.C. McRuer, Ontario Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights, Report No. 1, 
vol. 2 (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1968), c. 49, “Publication of Proceedings Before Trial”, at 755-69, 
especially 763 [hereinafter “McRuer Report”] (emphasis added). As the McRuer Report observed in 
1968, in comments equally applicable to bail hearings:  
The risk is that wide publication of the evidence given at a preliminary inquiry may so 
influence the minds of prospective jurors that they will approach their duties with con-
scious or unconscious bias against the accused, or that the public mind in the community 
will be so aroused that members of a trial jury will be intimidated by the force of public 
opinion. We have grave doubts that this is a real risk. In the first place, at the time of a 
preliminary inquiry no one, including the jurors, knows who the jurors at the trial will be. 
In metropolitan areas the public memory is very short and individuals are largely ano-
nymous. Few members of the public can remember what they have read or heard about a 
particular case for many days, let alone months. In less populous areas gossip and ru-
mour spread more easily, but gossip and rumour thrive on secrecy. It is much more likely 
that vicious and inaccurate gossip will be spread throughout a community by individuals 
who claim to have knowledge than by fair and accurate report by news media.  
53 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper 56: Public and Media Access to the 
Criminal Process (Ottawa, 1987), at 76-77 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added): 
These provisions, in our view, are overly restrictive of freedom of expression, notwith-
standing that they have both been found to be constitutionally valid. The mandatory 
nature of the prohibitions and their breadth constitute an unjustifiable intrusion on the 
principle of maximum openness. Other similar mandatory orders have, in fact, been 
found to offend the Charter. Our approach here is consistent with our earlier Recom-
mendation 3 that no automatic bans should remain in the Criminal Code. ... 
We would replace the present limitations with our Recommendation ... that an order 
should only be made when necessary to satisfy a substantial competing interest. ... It 
would require that a justice presiding at a bail hearing or preliminary inquiry consider 
whether other means of guaranteeing a fair trial would be effective before deciding to 
impose a publication ban. ... 
... We would remove the accused’s entitlement to an automatic publication ban on all 
evidence tendered at bail hearings and preliminary inquiries ... [I]f either the defence or 
the prosecution seeks a limit on the presumption of openness, it must discharge the cor-
responding onus of proof.  
54  [1984] O.J. No. 3066, 44 O.R. (2d) 609 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Global Communications”]. 
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on preliminary inquiries, was upheld on a similar basis in another early 
Charter decision in New Brunswick.55 
In light of the development of the Oakes test, the Dagen-
ais/Mentuck/Sierra Club test, and the other decisions of the Supreme 
Court favouring openness under the Charter, sections 517 and 539 
became ripe for challenge.  
VI. TORONTO STAR V. CANADA: THE ARRESTS OF  
THE “TORONTO 18” 
In 2006, 14 adults and four young persons were charged in Bramp-
ton, Ontario with various terrorism-related offences under the Criminal 
Code. The arrests raised widespread concerns about national security and 
the threat of terrorism, and were the subject of intense media scrutiny, 
locally, nationally and internationally. The police held press conferences 
announcing the arrests. Between June 3 and June 12, 2006, there were at 
least 4,710 articles reporting on the arrests by news organizations around 
the world, including virtually all local and national media as well as 
international media, such as CNN, BBC News, The Los Angeles Times, 
Al-Jazeera, The Bangkok Post, The Sydney Morning Herald, The New 
York Times and The Wall Street Journal.56  
Significant details about the alleged terrorist plots and the accused 
were disclosed by the police and reported, including the following: 
• The accused plotted to bomb the Toronto Stock Exchange, the CSIS 
Toronto Office, the CN Tower, the CBC, the Parliament buildings 
and/or the Peace Tower, and to storm the Parliament buildings, take 
political leaders hostage and behead the Prime Minister. 
• The accused were equipped with three tons of ammonium nitrate, 
other bomb-making materials, handguns, a Rambo-style assault 
knife, camouflage uniforms and walkie-talkies. 
• The accused set up and attended a terrorist training camp in 
Washago, Ontario and tested explosives in Matheson, Ontario. 
                                                                                                             
55  R. v. Banville, [1983] N.B.J. No. 110, 3 C.C.C. (3d) 312 (N.B.Q.B.). 
56  See Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd v. Canada, [2009] O.J. No. 288, 2009 ONCA 59, at 
para. 4 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Toronto Star v. Canada – CA”]. Additional facts may be found in 
the court Record. 
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• The accused were motivated by ideology supportive of militant 
Islamic causes, and were inspired by al-Qaeda. Some of the accused 
had links with Islamic militants and suspected terrorists in the 
United States and Europe. Certain of the accused allegedly had prior 
convictions for weapons offences and theft. 
Many of the allegations about the plans, preparations and motiva-
tions came from the police press conference following the arrests, at 
which they displayed purported bomb-making materials including a red 
cell phone wired to an explosive detonator. Statements from official 
sources included the following: 
This group posed a real and serious threat. It had the capacity and intent 
to carry out these attacks ... our investigation and arrests prevented the 
assembly of any bombs and the attacks from being carried out ... it was 
at the point when we felt we could no longer let them continue in their 
actions without a threat to the public. [Michael McDonell, Assistant 
Commissioner, RCMP] 
The suspects appeared to have become adherents of a violent ideology 
inspired by al-Qaeda. [Luc Portelance, Assistant Director of Operations, 
CSIS]57 
At a court appearance a few days after this firestorm of publicity, a 
justice of the peace imposed a publication ban under section 517 for the 
show cause hearings of all the adult accused, even though some of the 
accused had opposed the ban.58 A media coalition led by the New York-
based Associated Press moved to quash the publication ban on the basis 
that it should not apply to all accused when not all had requested a ban. 
Justice Durno of the Ontario Superior Court denied the media applica-
tion, finding (among other things) that “when persons are charged in the 
same information, and one seeks a mandatory order under s. 517, the 
order applies to all accused. Any other interpretation makes no practical 
                                                                                                             
57  See Jonathan Jenkins, “Cell Targeted CSIS and Police; ‘They Were Going After Institu-
tional Targets’, Sources Says” The Toronto Sun (June 4, 2006), at 2; Michelle Shephard & Isabel 
Teotonio, “Bomb-making material delivered in police sting” The Toronto Star (June 4, 2006), at A3; 
Doug Struck, “Canada Holds 17 in Alleged Bomb Plot; Strikes on Ontario Sites Said Imminent” The 
Washington Post (June 4, 2006), at A1; Beth Duff-Brown, “Canada foils terrorist attack with arrest 
of 17 al-Qaida-inspired Suspects” The Associated Press (June 3, 2006); Beth Duff-Brown, 
“Canadian Police Reportedly Moved in on Terrorist Suspects After Delivery of Bomb Materials” 
The Associated Press (June 4, 2006). 
58  Toronto Star v. Canada – CA, supra, note 56, at para. 5. 
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sense.”59 The appellants then challenged the constitutionality of section 
517 of the Criminal Code, supported by two of the accused. Justice 
Durno then held that he was bound by the 1984 decision of the Ontario 
Court of Appeal in Global Communications that upheld section 517.60 
Despite the extraordinary allegations and sensational public nature of 
the arrests, a number of the accused were released on bail — some even 
on consent. And while the challenge to the ban continued, the Crown 
stayed charges against at least three accused persons, while proceedings 
continued against others. No explanation was, or could be, given for 
these events due to the publication ban. 
The media appealed Durno J.’s decisions to the Ontario Court of Ap-
peal. A five-judge panel was unanimous that the decision in Global 
Communications should be overruled. Justice Feldman, speaking for the 
majority (Laskin and Simmons JJ.A. concurring), accepted the Crown’s 
assertion that the purpose of the mandatory ban was to provide the 
accused with an effective and expeditious means to prevent jurors from 
being exposed to prejudicial information that might be disclosed at their 
bail hearing.61 However, she found that section 517 was overbroad. 
Specifically, it did not meet the rational connection and minimal impair-
ment tests under R. v. Oakes62 to the extent that it imposed a mandatory 
ban even when there was no prospect of a jury trial. As she put it, “[f]air 
trial rights cannot be said to be at risk where a judge, sitting alone, is 
exposed to prejudicial information which should not be admitted at 
trial.”63 As a remedy, Feldman J.A. purported to cure the breach by 
adding to section 517 the words “where and for so long as the charge(s) 
may be tried by a jury” after “shall on application by the accused”.64  
Justice Rosenberg (Juriansz J.A. concurring) dissented. He would 
have struck down the section 517 ban entirely, on the basis that its 
deleterious effects outweighed its salutary effects.65 Justice Rosenberg 
described section 517 as a “dramatic curb on freedom of expression”, 
                                                                                                             
59  Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, [2006] O.J. No. 5781, 211 C.C.C. (3d) 234, at 
para. 101 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
60  Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, [2007] O.J. No. 5729, 84 O.R. (3d) 766, at 
para. 48 (Ont. S.C.J.); Global Communications, supra, note 54. 
61  Toronto Star v. Canada – CA, supra, note 56, at para. 239. 
62  [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). 
63  Toronto Star v. Canada – CA, supra, note 56, at para. 185. 
64  Id., at paras. 185, 250, 255. 
65  Id., at paras. 70-108. 
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and observed that the mandatory ban is “all-embracing; it prohibits 
publication of ‘the evidence taken, the information given or the represen-
tations made and the reasons, if any, given or to be given by the justice.’ 
Thus, even the reasons for releasing or detaining the accused, which may 
be of considerable interest to the public, cannot be published at the time 
the decision is made.”66 He also noted that although section 517 “does 
not prevent anyone from attending court to witness the operation of the 
bail system first hand, the section effectively prevents access to the 
courts for most of the population”.67 He observed that in the overwhelm-
ing majority of cases in which a publication ban is imposed, the ban does 
not serve the objective protecting the accused from a jury tainted by pre-
trial publicity since less than 2 per cent of all criminal cases are tried by a 
jury.68 To remedy the unconstitutionality of section 517, Rosenberg J.A. 
would have declared the words “and shall on application by the accused” 
to be of no force and effect.69  
The media appealed to the Supreme Court, asking that the dissenting 
view of Rosenberg J.A. be adopted. Among other things, the media 
appellants submitted that the majority’s remedy of “reading down” the 
application of section 517 to situations where a jury trial was not, or was 
no longer, possible, had little practical effect as most cases at least have 
the possibility of going to a jury at the early stages, and that the Dagen-
ais/Mentuck test, properly applied, could rarely justify bans on the 
publication of bail hearings.  
VII. THE ALBERTA CASE: R. V. WHITE70 
A challenge to section 517 was also brought in Alberta, although in a 
case raising quite different facts. It involved a high-profile murder, in 
which the accused was charged with killing his wife. White was granted 
bail, but his release was subsequently revoked by a decision of the Court 
                                                                                                             
66  Id., at paras. 31-32. 
67  Id., at para. 33. 
68  Id., at para. 80. Statistics from the Attorney General of Ontario filed in the case suggest 
that the number is much lower, perhaps 0.1 per cent — about 500 out of 500,000 charges in Ontario 
per year. 
69  Id., at para. 3. Justice Rosenberg would have also suspended the declaration of invalidity 
for one year to allow Parliament to consider alternative legislation.  
70  [2005] A.J. No. 1727, 2005 ABCA 435 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter “White”]; [2007] A.J. 
No. 608, 2007 ABQB 359 (Alta. Q.B.). 
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of Appeal. As the ban under section 517 does not apply to appellate 
proceedings, and as neither party sought to justify a common law 
discretionary restriction on publication, there was no publication ban on 
the bail proceedings before the Court of Appeal. However, the original 
section 517 ban on the proceedings before the Judge who had granted 
bail remained in place. The media moved, in these circumstances, to 
have section 517 of the Criminal Code declared unconstitutional in order 
to have the ban on the original bail hearing lifted. Justice Brooker, who 
had originally granted bail, agreed with the media that section 517 was 
aimed at preventing jury contamination and could not be justified. He 
noted that the Crown had not presented any evidence to support a 
rational connection between the restriction on publication and the 
accused’s right to a fair trial by a jury, that the section does not mini-
mally impair Charter rights as it applies even to non-jury trials, and that 
the salutary effects of the legislation were not proportionate to its 
deleterious effects.  
The Alberta Court of Appeal overturned Brooker J.’s decision, con-
cluding that a section 517 ban “merely defers publication and that the 
values of protecting fair access to bail and the right to a fair trial were 
benefits that outweighed the deleterious effects of the restrictions”.71 
VIII. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION UPHOLDING SECTION 517 
Justice Deschamps, writing for eight of the nine justices on the Su-
preme Court (Abella J. dissented), upheld the constitutionality of section 
517 in its entirety, even overturning the relatively limited reading down 
of the section by the majority in the Ontario Court of Appeal. In contrast 
to Toronto Star v. Ontario, which focused on the infringement of section 
2(b) (“the administration of justice thrives on exposure to light — and 
withers under a cloud of secrecy”),72 the majority in Toronto Star v. 
Canada focused on the rights of the accused, opening with the following 
statement: “[U]pholding the rights of Canadian citizens by fostering trial 
fairness and safeguarding liberty interests is central to the criminal 
                                                                                                             
71  R. v. White, [2008] A.J. No. 956, 2008 ABCA 294 (Alta. C.A.), as summarized by  
Deschamps J.A. in Toronto Star v. Canada – SCC, supra, note 11, at para. 5. 
72  Toronto Star v. Ontario, supra, note 1, at para. 1. 
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justice process.”73 This criminal context drove the Court’s analysis which 
led to a favouring of fair trial interests over openness. And while the 
Court said, again, that “the test developed in Dagenais/Mentuck incorpo-
rates the essence of the balancing exercise mandated by the Oakes 
test”,74 it is difficult to rationalize the Court’s decision with its earlier 
“unwavering decisions” favouring openness.  
How did the Court reach this result? First, the majority concluded 
that that there were two “pressing and substantial” objectives underlying 
section 517: (i) to safeguard the right to a fair trial; and (ii) to ensure 
expeditious bail hearings.75 This finding was broader than the finding of 
both the majority and the dissent at the Ontario Court of Appeal, both of 
which expressed the view that the primary objective of section 517 was 
to foster trial fairness. In response to the argument that the second 
objective was a new or impermissible “shifting purpose” not evident in 
any of the legislative debates or raised by the Crown 25 years earlier in 
Global Communications, Deschamps J. stated that the two objectives are 
“inextricably linked, as the latter embraces the former”. The acceptance 
of this new, second purpose, was derived from the “particular emphasis 
placed in the Ouimet Report on ensuring expeditious bail hearings”.76 
However, that objective is met through other provisions (such as section 
503(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, which requires that an accused be 
brought before a justice “without unreasonable delay”) and was never 
linked to section 517. But by stating the objective this broadly, the majority 
was able to find that the other elements of the Oakes test were met. 
Second, Deschamps J. concluded that a “rational connection can 
clearly be found” between the adopted means and Parliament’s objec-
tives in enacting section 517. She noted that the bail hearing process is 
informal, must be brought expeditiously and often includes evidence or 
information that “would not necessarily be relevant or admissible at 
trial”, such as confessions or bad character evidence.77 The ban, there-
fore, “prevents the dissemination of evidence which, for the sake of 
                                                                                                             
73  Supra, note 11, at para. 1. 
74  Id., at para. 18. 
75  Id., at para. 19. 
76  Id., at para. 23; Roger Ouimet, Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections: To-
ward Unity: Criminal Justice and Corrections (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1969). 
77  Toronto Star v. Canada – SCC, supra, note 11, at para. 30. 
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ensuring an expeditious hearing, is untested”.78 But the link to an 
expeditious hearing is not explained. Rather, as Deschamps J. notes, the 
provision was proposed by the Ouimet Report “to prevent prejudicing the 
accused at his trial by the dissemination of prejudicial matter which 
would not be relevant or admissible at his trial”.79 Yet this concern for 
fair trial interests, in light of Dagenais, makes the section difficult to 
defend, as discussed below. 
Turning to minimal impairment, Deschamps J. emphasized that the 
initial stage of a criminal proceeding is “crucial” to the accused, and that 
“if the justice were to hold a publication ban hearing, the accused would 
have to prepare for that hearing in addition to preparing a rebuttal to the 
grounds the prosecution might raise to justify detaining him or her”.80 
After noting that “the hurdles the accused would face in such a hearing 
are real”, she concluded that “[i]n light of the delay and the resources a 
publication ban hearing would entail, and of the prejudice that could 
result if untested evidence were made public, it would be difficult to 
imagine a measure capable of achieving Parliament’s objectives that 
would involve a more limited impairment of freedom of expression.”81 
Justice Deschamps rejected various discretionary alternatives to com-
plete mandatory bans that the media argued would trench less on free-
dom of expression.82 In view of the timing of any potential publication 
ban hearing, and of how little the accused would know about the infor-
mation the prosecutor would be conveying, she held that it would be 
difficult for the accused to discharge the burden of showing that a ban 
would be necessary under the Dagenais/Mentuck test.83  
Surprisingly, especially in light of the “unwavering decisions” of the 
previous decades, Deschamps J. seemed to find the ban was not particu-
larly harsh because media are still permitted to publish “the identity of 
                                                                                                             
78  Id., at para. 33.  
79  Id., at para. 30. 
80  Id., at para. 35. 
81  Id., at para. 37.  
82  These alternatives included: (i) procedures to address jury bias, such as challenge for 
cause, change of venue and jury sequestration; (ii) time-limited publication bans ordered summarily, 
subject to a follow-up hearing to determine if the ban should continue; (iii) “sunset clauses” that 
would allow publication at the time of the bail hearing but ban publication closer to trial; (iv) limited 
discretionary bans on specific prejudicial information and (v) a limited mandatory ban on specific 
types of evidence, such as confessions. 
83  Toronto Star v. Canada – SCC, supra, note 11, at paras. 44, 46.  
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the accused, comment on the facts and the offence that the accused has 
been charged with, and that an application for bail has been made, as 
well as report on the outcome of the application”.84 She stated that “the 
temporary nature of the ban is another important factor”, suggesting that 
“the information it covers can eventually be made public once more 
complete information produced in accordance with the standards appli-
cable to criminal trials is available”.85 As Deschamps J. put it:  
In summary, although information revealed at the bail hearing may no 
longer be newsworthy by the time the media can release it, the ban 
cannot be said to impair freedom of expression more than is necessary. 
The ban is limited to a preliminary stage of the criminal justice process 
and is not absolute, and the information the media are prevented from 
publishing is untested, and is often one-sided and largely irrelevant to 
the search for truth. The ban may make journalists’ work more difficult, 
but it does not prevent them from conveying and commenting on basic, 
relevant information.86 
The Court at this stage also took issue with the majority decision in 
the Ontario Court of Appeal that would have limited the ban to circum-
stances where a jury trial was and remained a possibility. Picking up on 
Rosenberg J.A.’s comment that “the practical impact of the majority’s 
conclusion is limited, since at the time of the bail hearing, the accused 
has usually not yet made an election and not yet ruled out the possibility 
of being tried by a jury”, Deschamps J. noted: 
Because the bail hearing is held at the beginning of the process, even if 
the provision is read down as the majority have done, the ban would 
still apply in the vast majority of cases. Thus, this alternative cannot be 
accepted. Not only does it fail to respond to the appellants’ concerns, 
but it fails to settle the timing and resource issues that arise in respect 
of the proposed publication ban hearing.87 
Finally, Deschamps J. concluded that mandatory publication bans 
had salutary benefits that outweighed their deleterious effects. Although 
such bans were “not a perfect outcome”, she concluded that the manda-
tory ban “represents a reasonable compromise”, as the limits on the 
                                                                                                             
84  Id., at para. 38. 
85  Id., at para. 39. 
86  Id., at para. 40.  
87  Id., at para. 47. 
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publication of information were “outweighed by the need to ensure 
certainty and timeliness, to conserve resources, and to avert the disclo-
sure of untested prejudicial information; in other words, to guarantee as 
much as possible trial fairness and fair access to bail”.88  
Justice Abella, in dissent, agreed with Rosenberg J.A. that the man-
datory ban in section 517 should be struck down. Unlike Deschamps J., 
Abella J. emphasized the importance of openness: 
This Court has a long pedigree in protecting the public’s right to be 
aware of what takes place in the country’s courtrooms. It is based on 
the premise that to maintain public trust in the justice system, the public 
must be able to see the judicial process at work. The public’s ability to 
engage in meaningful discussion about what a judge decides, depends 
primarily on knowing why the particular decision is made. The 
jurisprudence has, as a result, consistently attempted to enhance both 
the visibility of the system and the confidence of the public.89  
She characterized the effect of section 517 as “a profound interfer-
ence” with the open courts principle because it had the effect, “for all but 
the handful of people who are present in the courtroom, of denying 
access to information surrounding a key aspect of the criminal justice 
system — the decision whether or not to release an accused back in to 
the community pending his or her trial”.90 
IX. THE SUPREME COURT’S RETREAT FROM DAGENAIS 
Toronto Star v. Canada represents a retreat by the Supreme Court 
from its long history of upholding the open courts principle and freedom 
of the press, and its skepticism that pre-trial publicity impairs fair trial 
rights. The effect of Deschamps J.’s judgment, as Abella J. noted, is that 
bail hearings can continue to operate — to paraphrase Bentham — in the 
darkness of secrecy. This harms public confidence in the bail process, the 
public’s right to scrutinize judicial processes, and fair trial interests, as 
Berger J.A. of the Alberta Court of Appeal pointed out in the first White 
decision.91  
                                                                                                             
88  Id., at para. 60. 
89  Id., at para. 65 (emphasis in original). 
90  Id., at para. 67. 
91  White, supra, note 70, at para. 16, per Berger J.A. in chambers:  
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As noted above, Deschamps J. grounded her analysis of section 517 
on the dual premises that mandatory publication bans requested by the 
accused at bail hearings (i) safeguard fair trial rights; and (ii) ensure 
expeditious bail hearings. Each of these rationales may be criticized.  
1.  Safeguarding Fair Trial Rights Does Not Require Mandatory 
Publication Bans 
Section 517 bluntly creates a sweeping ban on all information at bail 
hearings, regardless of the evidence or information presented, and 
regardless of how unlikely it may be — if it is even possible — that the 
case will result in a jury trial. This is because section 517 applies to all 
criminal cases, many of which, such as summary conviction offences, 
cannot possibly be tried by a jury. As Rosenberg J.A. pointed out, “in the 
overwhelming majority of cases in which a publication ban is imposed 
and freedom of expression infringed, the ban does not serve the objective 
of protecting the accused from a jury tainted by pre-trial publicity”.92 
Although Rosenberg J.A. observed that “less than 2 percent of all 
criminal cases are tried by jury”,93 in fact the statistics presented sug-
gested that the number may be as low as 0.1 per cent. This point was also 
made in the McRuer Report in recommending against publication bans.94 
More significantly, however, there is no basis to conclude that pub-
licity at a bail hearing will jeopardize the fairness of a jury trial. There 
has never been a case in Canada in which an impartial jury has not been 
found, regardless of the level of pre-trial publicity, including publicity 
from prior trials where re-trials have been necessary,95 and where trials 
                                                                                                             
I ask rhetorically: ‘How is public confidence enhanced by a “cone of silence” descending 
over the careful and considered analysis of the adjudicator?’ Keeping the public in the 
dark, in my opinion, can be a recipe for uninformed speculation fuelling widely publi-
cized concern in the community — a far greater risk to the fair trial rights of the accused 
and the Crown. 
92  Toronto Star v. Canada – CA, supra, note 56, at para. 80. 
93  Id. 
94  McRuer Report, supra, note 52, at 755-69, especially at 763. 
95  As Rosenberg J.A. noted, “commentary from judges in Canada and other common-law 
jurisdictions is virtually uniform that the impact of pre-trial publicity is speculative and that other 
measures short of a contemporaneous ban on publication of the entire proceeding will protect the 
accused’s fair trial rights”. See Toronto Star v. Canada – CA, supra, note 56, at para. 93 (emphasis 
added). 
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have followed highly publicized public inquiries, such as Mount Cashel96 
and Westray.97 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has addressed this issue 
in several cases. Echoing the McRuer Report, Cory J. stated in Phillips: 
In my view, the Westray Inquiry hearings would not present an 
unacceptable risk to the s. 11(d) fair trial rights of the respondent 
managers. Often the publicity pertaining to the evidence given at the 
Inquiry will have little effect on potential jurors. The impact may be 
fleeting and quickly fade away. How very quickly the details of a news 
story can be forgotten. The passage of a very few days may suffice to 
dim if not obliterate the memory of the reporting of Inquiry evidence. 
The likelihood of a prejudicial effect upon fair trial rights may be small 
indeed, a minor item washed away in the flood of information 
generated daily by the media.98 
The Supreme Court has also repeatedly emphasized its confidence in 
the ability of jurors to disabuse themselves of information that it is not 
entitled to consider.99 Addressing the jury’s ability to ignore prejudicial 
pre-trial publicity, Lamer C.J.C., in Dagenais, expressed “doubt that 
jurors are always adversely influenced by publications” and his belief 
“that jurors are capable of following instructions from trial judges and 
                                                                                                             
96  Kenny, supra, note 31. 
97  Phillips v. Nova Scotia (Commission of Inquiry into the Westray Mine Tragedy), [1995] 
S.C.J. No. 36, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 97 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Phillips”]. 
98  Id., at para. 161 (emphasis added). To similar effect, five judges of the Ontario Court of 
Appeal, in R. v. Hubbert, quoted the following with approval (emphasis added):  
This does, in my judgment, lead to a prima facie presumption that anybody who may 
have read that kind of information might find it difficult to reach a verdict in a fair-
minded way. It is, however, a matter of human experience, and certainly a matter of the 
experience of those who practice in the criminal courts, first, that the public’s recollec-
tion is short, and, secondly, that the drama, if I may use that term, of a trial almost al-
ways has the effect of excluding from recollection that which went before.  
See R. v. Hubbert, [1975] O.J. No. 2595, 29 C.C.C. (2d) 279, at para. 30 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter 
“Hubbert”], quoting Lawton J. in R. v. Kray (1969), 53 Cr. App. R. 412, at 415. See also R. v. 
Murrin, [1997] B.C.J. No. 3182 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Murrin”], where Oppal J. remarked at para. 
20 that “[c]ommon sense tells us that public knowledge is at times fleeting in matters of this nature”; 
White, supra, note 70, at para. 17, where Berger J.A. stated, “I very much doubt that prospective 
jurors would retain and recall the details of a 30 second news clip or a seven inch column summariz-
ing submissions made by counsel, or reasons for decision pronounced by a bail judge”; R. v. Steele, 
2007 CarswellOnt 3045 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
99  See, e.g., R. v. Vermette, [1988] S.C.J. No. 47, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 985, at 992-94 (S.C.C.); 
R. v. Sherratt, [1991] S.C.J. No. 21, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 509, at 525 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sherratt”]. 
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ignoring information not presented to them in the course of criminal 
proceedings”.100 
The Supreme Court accepts that jurors are capable of ignoring highly 
prejudicial information (such as prior convictions) when so directed, and 
can consider prejudicial information for certain purposes (such as 
credibility) and not for others (guilt or innocence). This reflects a high 
degree of confidence in the ability of jurors to do their job. This faith in 
juries is central to the criminal justice system. As Dickson C.J.C. stated:  
… the Court should not be heard to call into question the capacity of 
jurors to do the job assigned to them. The ramifications of any such 
statement could be enormous. Moreover, the fundamental right to a 
jury trial has recently been underscored by s. 11(f) of the Charter. If 
that right is important, it is logically incoherent to hold that juries are 
incapable of following the explicit instructions of the judge.101 
In Phillips v. Nova Scotia, in refusing an application to stay a public 
inquiry on the basis that pre-trial publicity would prejudice the right to a 
fair trial, Cory J. stated: 
I am of the view that this objective [a fair trial] is readily attainable in 
the vast majority of criminal trials even in the face of a great deal of 
publicity. The jury system is a cornerstone of our democratic society. 
The presence of a jury has for centuries been the hallmark of a fair trial. 
I cannot accept the contention that increasing mass media attention to a 
particular case has made this vital institution either obsolete or 
unworkable. There is no doubt that extensive publicity can prompt 
discussion, speculation, and the formation of preliminary opinions in 
the minds of potential jurors. However, the strength of the jury has 
always been the faith accorded to the good will and good sense of the 
individual jurors in any given case.102  
Many lower court judgments make similar statements, some in the 
face of very prejudicial and “sustained” pre-trial information.103 In 
Kenny, for example, a stay of proceeding was denied where the accused 
                                                                                                             
100  Dagenais, supra, note 7, at para. 87. In Dagenais, Lamer C.J.C. allowed that there could 
be a possible exception in a case of sustained pre-trial publicity, but that is not what would result 
from the publication of show cause hearings. 
101  R. v. Corbett, [1988] S.C.J. No. 40, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670, at 691-94, especially 693 
(S.C.C.) (emphasis added). 
102  Phillips, supra, note 97, at para. 133. 
103  Sherratt, supra, note 99, at 525. 
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was charged after the “Mount Cashel” Inquiry, at which there had been 
intense media coverage, including testimony (provided under relaxed 
rules of evidence) from seven of the 10 sexual assault complainants.104  
In White, Berger J.A. commented: 
The Applicant has been charged with second-degree murder. His 
preliminary hearing will not take place until the new year. If committed 
to stand trial, jury selection would begin months later. I very much doubt 
that prospective jurors would retain and recall the details of a 30 second 
news clip or a seven inch column summarizing submissions made by 
counsel, or reasons for decision pronounced by a bail judge. Even if 
some did, the usual admonitions to the array, challenges for cause, and 
jury instructions themselves, are, in my opinion, sufficient safeguards to 
ensure that an impartial jury, true to their oaths, will be empanelled. 
While the underlying fear is that issues will be pre-judged or that there 
will be “trial by media” without the benefit of safeguards inherent in 
legal proceedings, I am convinced that the average citizen understands 
full well what Voltaire meant when he said in 1760: “When we hear news 
we should always wait for the sacrament of confirmation.” 105  
Justice Berger’s opinion is consistent with Lamer C.J.C.’s comments 
in Dagenais about the availability of alternative measures: 
Possibilities that readily come to mind, however, include adjourning 
trials, changing venues, sequestering jurors, allowing challenges for 
cause and voir dires during jury selection, and providing strong judicial 
direction to the jury. Sequestration and judicial direction were available 
                                                                                                             
104  Kenny, supra, note 31, at 14-15: 
I accept that people are biased by pre-trial publicity in the sense that they develop pre-
conceived ideas. However, I accept that they are capable of responding to the instructions 
of the Trial Judge and of obeying their oath, notwithstanding any previously formed 
opinions. See Hubbert and Keegstra. The notion that people are unable to assess how 
much they have been biased by publicity is one which attacks the very heart of the jury 
system. If this is true, prospective jurors will not be able to reveal their biases when ques-
tioned by triers. They will not be able to obey their oaths or follow the judge’s instruc-
tions because they will not recognize their own biases ... I am not persuaded, however, 
that there is anything so significantly new and startling in these [studies], in comparison 
to what was previously available to Parliament and the Supreme Court of Canada, as to 
require me to strike down the jury system which dates back to the Magna Carta of 1215. 
105  White, supra, note 70, at para. 17 (emphasis added). 
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for the Dagenais jury. Apart from sequestration, all of the other effective 
alternatives to bans were available for the other three accused.106 
In Hubbert, the Ontario Court of Appeal noted that “[p]rior informa-
tion about a case, and even the holding of a tentative opinion about it, 
does not make partial a juror sworn to render a true verdict according to 
the evidence.”107 Put another way, an accused is entitled to an impartial 
jury, not an ignorant one.  
Similar faith in the ability of jurors to do their job impartially is 
found in other common law jurisdictions. In England, in Montgomery v. 
HM Advocate and another,108 the accused were brought to trial after a 
firestorm of adverse publicity, including comments from a judge about 
the culpability of the accused that were widely reported. The defendants’ 
motion for a stay on the basis that they could not have a fair trial in light 
of the adverse pre-trial publicity was dismissed. In the House of Lords, 
Lord Hope of Craighead noted that “the entire system of trial by jury is 
based upon the assumption that the jury will follow the instructions 
which they receive from the trial judge and that they will return a true 
verdict in accordance with the evidence.”109  
In R. v. B., the English Court of Appeal recently addressed the ability 
of jurors to follow instructions despite pre-trial publicity in a case 
involving charges of terrorist activity that had attracted much interest, 
noting that “[j]uries follow the directions which the judge will give them 
                                                                                                             
106  Dagenais, supra, note 7, at para. 79. For examples of courts employing the alternative 
measure of sunset clauses, see R. v. Brown, [1998] O.J. No. 482, 126 C.C.C. (3d) 187, at 15-18 (Ont. 
Gen. Div.) [hereinafter “Brown”]; R. v. Lake, [1997] O.J. No. 5446, at paras. 24-27 (Ont. Gen. Div.) 
[hereinafter “Lake”]; Murrin, supra, note 98, at paras. 16-21. 
107  Hubbert, supra, note 98, at para. 29. See also Brown, id., at para. 13: “Under our law the 
courts have consistently expressed confidence in the dynamics of the jury system as a means of 
ensuring juries render fair and impartial verdicts. Prior information about an accused or the trial does 
not in itself disqualify a potential juror — nor does the holding of a tentative opinion about the 
case.”; R. v. Bryant, [1980] O.J. No. 3914, 54 C.C.C. (2d) 54, at para. 23 (Ont. H.C.J.) (quoting the 
McRuer Report: “[t]he requirement that the verdict of a jury must be unanimous constitutes a real 
safeguard against bias or prejudice. There may be some risk that one or two jurors may allow their 
preconceived notions to deflect them from the requirements of their oaths as jurymen, but that 
twelve jurors will all be derelict to the sanctity of their oaths is very remote”); R. v. Keegstra, [1991] 
A.J. No. 232, [1991] 63 C.C.C. (3d) 110 at para. 10 (Alta. C.A.); Lake, id.; Edmonton (City) v. Kara, 
[1995] A.J. No. 5, [1995] 4 W.W.R. 99, at para. 10 (Alta. Q.B.); Murrin, id., at paras. 17-21; Kenny, 
supra, note 31, at 8-18. 
108  [2003] 1 AC 641 (P.C.) [hereinafter “Montgomery”]. 
109  Id., at 674. 
(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)  THE SUPREME COURT’S RETREAT FROM OPENNESS 223 
 
to focus exclusively on the evidence and to ignore anything they may 
have heard or read out of court.”110  
Similar positions have, not surprisingly, been stated by the highest 
courts in Australia,111 Ireland112 and the United States.113 
Nor does the social science evidence support the concern that jurors 
will be prejudiced. In the Ontario Court of Appeal, Feldman J.A. noted 
that there is “no definitive evidence of the extent to which juries’ verdicts 
may be affected by … information they glean outside the trial”.114 Justice 
Rosenberg’s review of the social science literature concluded that “it is 
difficult to draw firm conclusions from this material”.115  
It is striking, therefore, that Deschamps J. grounded her judgment in 
Toronto Star v. Canada to such an extent on the possibility of jury 
tainting in light of this long line of jurisprudence that addresses this 
concern. Indeed, it might be said that here too there have been “unwaver-
ing decisions” of the Court that pre-trial publicity will not prejudice fair 
trial rights, and that ample safeguards exist to address the issue when the 
concern may exist — as in Dagenais. Yet none of this jurisprudence was 
referred to by the majority. As Abella J., dissenting, stated: 
Concerns over pre-trial publicity were addressed by this Court when 
it considered the question of discretionary bans in Dagenais and 
Mentuck. The new threshold articulated in those cases was a high one, 
and bans were only to be imposed where they are “necessary” to 
protect against “real and substantial” risks to an accused’s fair trial 
rights (Dagenais, at p. 878), or “serious” risks to the administration of 
justice (Mentuck, at para. 32). Section 517, in granting an automatic 
ban at the request of an accused regardless of whether he or she can 
demonstrate such a degree of risk, completely collapses the 
constitutional framework in Dagenais/Mentuck, leaving out of the 
                                                                                                             
110  R. v. B., [2006] EWCA Crim 2692, at para. 31 (C.A.) [hereinafter “R. v. B.”]. See also 
Montgomery, supra, note 108, at 673-74; Ex parte Telegraph Plc., [1993] 2 All E.R. 971, at 978 
(C.A.); R. v. Abu Hamza, [2006] EWCA Crim 2918, [2007] QB 659 (C.A.). More recently, in 
Sinclair v. HM Advocate, the English Court of Appeal noted that “the whole jury system depends on 
there being trust between judge and jury, including an understanding that jurors will not deliberately 
disobey the instructions on law or procedure which they are given by the trial judge”. See Sinclair v. 
HM Advocate, [2007] HCJAC 27, at para. 16 (C.A.). 
111  R. v. Glennon (1992), 173 C.L.R. 592, 106 A.L.R. 177 (H.C.A.). 
112  Z. v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1994] 2 I.R. 476, at 508 (I.S.C.). 
113  Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, at 568-70 (S.C., 1976). 
114  Toronto Star v. Canada – CA, supra, note 56, at para. 167. 
115  Id., at para. 87. 
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balance entirely the public’s presumptive right to know what goes on in 
a courtroom.  
Even if one is disinclined to accept what is to me the cogent 
evidence in the reasons of Rosenberg J.A. demonstrating how 
speculative the concerns over pre-trial publicity are, there remains the 
possibility of remedies such as a partial ban, challenges for cause, or a 
change of venue if there is a sufficient risk of prejudice. We should also 
be able to rely on the ability of a properly instructed jury to disregard 
irrelevant evidence, a reliance that is at the foundation of our belief in 
juries in criminal trials (Dagenais, at pp. 884-85; see also R. v. Corbett, 
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 670, at pp. 692-93; R. v. Vermette, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 
985, at pp. 992-93).  
..... 
In any event, s. 517 only protects an accused from disclosure of pre-
trial information from a bail hearing. There is no legislative protection 
from potentially prejudicial pre-trial information that emanates from 
sources other than the bail hearing. In the absence of such a generalized 
ban, the benefit of a ban only on bail hearing information seems to me 
to be too porous to justify the seriousness of the infringement.116 
2.  Section 517 Is Not Necessary to Ensure Expeditious Bail 
Hearings 
Justice Deschamps’s decision largely focused on what she had found 
was the other purpose of the legislation — to ensure expeditious bail 
hearings. Without the mandatory ban, she said, “an additional burden 
would be placed on the accused at a time when he or she is extremely 
vulnerable”, perhaps “overwhelmed by the criminal process”, without 
counsel or the “opportunity to learn what evidence the prosecution 
intends to adduce”.117 As Deschamps J. put it: “They should be devoting 
their resources and energy to obtaining their release, not to deciding 
whether to compromise on liberty in order to avoid having evidence 
aired outside the courtroom.”118 She continued: 
                                                                                                             
116  Toronto Star v. Canada – SCC, supra, note 11, at paras. 71-73. 
117  Id., at para. 36. 
118  Id. 
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In light of the delay and the resources a publication ban hearing would 
entail, and of the prejudice that could result if untested evidence were 
made public, it would be difficult to imagine a measure capable of 
achieving Parliament’s objectives that would involve a more limited 
impairment of freedom of expression. If issues unrelated to the release 
of the accused were added to the bail hearing, this would require the 
consideration of matters extraneous to the bail process and could have a 
domino effect on other bail hearings in the same forum, thereby 
delaying the administration of justice.119 
Justice Deschamps referred repeatedly to the burden on the accused 
and the delay that would be caused if publication bans had to be justified 
at bail hearings. While she recognized that bans are discretionary when 
sought by the prosecutor, “[u]nlike the accused, the prosecutor knows 
exactly what allegations are to be made against the accused and also 
knows what evidence will likely be introduced at trial.”120 While one 
might have thought that this knowledge could — and should — be used 
by the Crown to also protect fair trial interests in appropriate cases, such 
as, for example, where evidence of a confession will be presented at a 
bail hearing and so that fact might be the subject of a ban, this was not 
considered by the court. 
The appellant’s argument, based on the Dagenais test, was dismissed 
in the following statement: 
The appellants argue that bail hearings would almost never be delayed 
if the ban were discretionary because the Dagenais test would rarely be 
met, since jury bias is purely speculative. As a result, counsel would 
seldom bring motions for bans. This proposition is based on the 
assumption that accused would renounce their interest in trial fairness 
to ensure an expeditious hearing. This is exactly the kind of 
compromise the mandatory ban is intended to avoid. The appellants’ 
argument is in fact based on the incorrect view that the ban has nothing 
to do with the rights of the accused to a fair trial and to fair access to 
bail. It is simply wrong to assume that neither the bail hearing itself nor 
the disclosure of information, evidence or the reasons for the justice’s 
order would have any effect on the accused’s interests.121 
                                                                                                             
119  Id., at para. 37.  
120  Id., at para. 46. 
121  Id., at para. 57.  
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This reasoning, however, is based on the presumption that “trial fair-
ness” will be compromised by a ban. It fails to consider that in the very 
small number of appropriate cases where a limited ban might be justified 
(such as where a confession is adduced) the issuance and tailoring of a 
ban can be effected promptly and without delay. As Rosenberg J.A. 
observed in the Ontario Court of Appeal: 
Even granting the possibility that pre-trial publicity can influence jury 
behaviour, this would only be the case in the most unusual instances, 
being cases where a single powerful piece of inadmissible evidence 
comes to the attention of the jury pool at a time proximate enough to 
the trial to have an impact.122  
Notice to the media is not required, and should not result in adjourn-
ments, as Abella J. pointed out in dissent.123  
The Dagenais test, properly applied, would rarely, if ever, justify 
bans on publication of bail hearings, and may only, in very limited 
circumstances, justify even a partial ban. In those limited circumstances, 
which may be identified by the Crown or the defence (e.g., evidence of a 
confession, or inculpatory wiretap evidence, perhaps), a ban may be 
sought and justified under the flexible Dagenais test. In other circum-
stances — the vast majority of cases — it would be irrational for accused 
persons to bring futile motions that might delay their own release. 
In any event, publication bans, if sought, can and should usually be 
decided summarily, just as bail hearings proceed in an expeditious 
                                                                                                             
122  Toronto Star v. Canada – CA, supra, note 56, at para. 90. 
123  Id., at para. 74. The Supreme Court has never said that notice — while desirable — is 
mandatory. As Fish J. stated in Toronto Star v. Ontario, supra, note 1, at para. 31:  
It hardly follows, however, that the Dagenais/Mentuck test should be applied mechanisti-
cally. Regard must always be had to the circumstances in which a sealing order is sought 
by the Crown, or by others with a real and demonstrated interest in delaying public dis-
closure. The test, though applicable at all stages, is a flexible and contextual one. Courts 
have thus tailored it to fit a variety of discretionary actions, such as confidentiality orders, 
judicial investigative hearings, and Crown-initiated applications for publication bans. 
And as Rosenberg J.A. noted in Toronto Star v. Canada – CA, supra, note 56, at para. 97:  
… as to notice, the justice has a discretion whether to give notice and the form of notice: 
Dagenais, at 869. Given the need for an expedited bail hearing to avoid the unwarranted 
detention of the accused, it would seem to me that in most cases the justice need not give 
notice to the media. Such an approach appears to be authorized by Named Person v. 
Vancouver Sun, [2007] S.C.J. No. 43, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 253 (S.C.C.), where the Court 
held, at paras. 53-54, that notice need not be given every time an in camera proceeding is 
to take place …  
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manner, with judges receiving all evidence that is “credible or trustwor-
thy”, often simply allegations from the police or Crown counsel.124 As 
Rosenberg J.A. stated:  
As to the issue of the accused needing time to gather “evidence” of the 
risk to trial fairness or the administration of justice, this issue must be 
put in context. As already noted, the strict rules of evidence do not 
apply at bail hearings. In my view, in considering whether to impose a 
publication ban, the justice of the peace is entitled to act upon the kind 
of information that can be received on a bail hearing, being evidence 
that is considered credible and trustworthy. It is not unusual for 
evidence to be presented through statements of facts read out by Crown 
counsel. It would seem to me that the justice of the peace would be 
entitled to act upon submissions of counsel in deciding whether or not 
to impose a publication ban. It is not practicable to expect the party 
seeking the order to adduce the kind of evidence that might be 
admissible at a trial, in accordance with the normal rules of evidence.125 
X. WHAT OF OPENNESS? SALUTARY AND DELETERIOUS EFFECTS 
Justice Deschamps did note that section 517 has the deleterious ef-
fect of banning the media “from informing the population on matters of 
interest which could otherwise be subject more widely to public de-
bate”.126 However, she concluded that “on balance ... the deleterious 
effects of the limits on the publication of information are outweighed by 
the need to ensure certainty and timeliness, to conserve resources, and to 
avert the disclosure of untested prejudicial information”.127 As noted 
earlier, Deschamps J. minimized some of the effects of the ban, noting 
that it “is not an absolute ban on access to the courts or on publication” 
and that it is “temporary”, that it “applies only with respect to the bail 
process, and the information it covers can eventually be made public 
                                                                                                             
124  Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 518(1)(e). See also R. v. John, [2001] O.J. No. 
3396, at para. 56 (Ont. S.C.J.), per Hill J.: “A bail hearing is not a trial. Nor should this summary 
proceeding assume the complications of a trial.”  
125  Toronto Star v. Canada – CA, supra, note 56, at para. 99. 
126  Toronto Star v. Canada – SCC, supra, note 11, at para. 58. 
127  Id., at para. 60. 
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once more complete information produced in accordance with the 
standards applicable to criminal trials is available”.128 
These rationales for overriding section 2(b) are troubling, and incon-
sistent with prior decisions of the Court. While Deschamps J. may be 
correct that section 517 does not create an “absolute ban”, it prevents 
reporting of any meaningful information that would allow the public to 
know why an accused is detained or released. This “cone of silence”129 
prevents an understanding by the public of the bail process generally — a 
critical aspect of criminal justice. The decision whether to grant bail can 
have a more significant impact on the accused than any other decision in 
a criminal case, and may lead to the only term in custody he or she will 
serve. Professor Friedland noted many years ago that  
[t]he period before trial is too important to be left to guess-work and 
caprice. ... but also may have a substantial impact on the result of the 
trial itself. The law should abhor any unnecessary deprivation of liberty 
and positive steps should be taken to ensure that detention before trial 
is kept to a minimum.130  
Imprisonment prior to conviction, no matter how brief, is an exercise 
of the utmost power of the state to limit an individual’s freedom, at a 
time when the individual is presumed to be innocent.  
There is a very significant public interest in judicial decisions about 
bail. In R. v. Hall, the Supreme Court upheld the provision that allows a 
judge to deny bail when necessary to maintain confidence in the admini-
stration of justice. The existence of this section, and this Court’s decision 
that it is a valid ground on which to deny bail, underlines the importance 
of judicial interim release decisions. As McLachlin C.J.C. stated: 
“Without public confidence, the bail system and the justice system 
generally stand compromised.”131  
Yet, as Rosenberg J.A. noted in the Ontario Court of Appeal, section 
517 “stifles informed public participation in one of the crucial aspects of 
the criminal justice system”.132 He continued: 
                                                                                                             
128  Id., at para. 39. 
129  Justice Berger in White, supra, note 70, at para. 16. 
130  Friedland, supra, note 51, at 172. 
131  [2002] S.C.J. No. 65, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, at para. 31 (S.C.C.) (see also para. 27) [here- 
inafter “Hall”]. See also White, supra, note 70. 
132  Reasons of Rosenberg J.A., Toronto Star v. Canada – CA, supra, note 56, at para. 83. 
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Section 517, however, prevents the dissemination of information 
necessary to promote public confidence in the bail system. This is the 
case both at the time the initial decision is made, and later where 
subsequent events may raise questions as to the wisdom of that 
decision, as when the accused who is on bail commits further offences. 
The fact that an accused was on bail when he or she committed a 
further serious offence often receives wide coverage in the media. 
However, the public is left to speculate as to why the accused was 
initially released, because of the s. 517 order.133  
Such concerns — deleterious effects — are given short shift by the 
majority in the Supreme Court — mentioned only briefly and dismissed 
with the paternalistic suggestion that a bail hearing “may not be fully 
understood by the public” and that “the media would be better equipped 
to explain the judicial process to the public if the information they could 
convey were not restricted”.134 One might have thought these concerns 
favoured openness! Indeed, as the cloak of secrecy applies to bail 
decisions as well as the hearings themselves, section 517 likely inhibits 
academic scrutiny of the process.  
Nor does the majority ever contend with its “unwavering” line of 
cases that the openness principle applies at every stage of the criminal 
process. While the Court refers, for example, to Re Vancouver Sun,135 for 
the proposition that all discretionary bans are subject to the Dagen-
ais/Mentuck test, it makes no attempt to reconcile that decision which 
effectively turned ex parte — and necessarily in camera — investigative 
hearings into hearings in which Dagenais/Mentuck applies. 
The fact that a ban is “temporary” is not a justification, but should 
only be considered once it is determined that a ban is necessary at all. 
This was the approach of the Court in Toronto Star v. Ontario where a 
delay of 90 days in access to search warrant materials was not a justifica-
tion for the ban. In any event, these bans may be long-lasting and are 
often in place for years. Yet, as Rosenberg J.A. stated in the Court of 
Appeal, “the public is most interested in the information disclosed at the 
bail hearing … when the bail decision is made. That is the point in the 
                                                                                                             
133  Id., at para. 78 (emphasis added). Similar points were made by Abella J., dissenting in the 
Supreme Court, supra, note 11, at para. 68. 
134  Toronto Star v. Canada – SCC, supra, note 11, at para. 59. 
135  [2004] S.C.J. No. 41, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332, at para. 18 (S.C.C.), referred to by Deschamps J. 
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proceedings when the public is entitled to scrutinize and hold the 
criminal justice system to account.” 136  
Courts have repeatedly emphasized the importance of timeliness in 
news reporting.137 As Doherty J.A. put it: “The values promoted by  
s. 2(b) are not served by publication when the speaker has lost his 
audience and the message to be conveyed has lost its purpose.”138 Justice 
Nordheimer recently commented that “... transgression of fundamental 
freedoms ought not to be readily justified on the basis that any such 
infringements will be transient or short-lived”.139 Delayed scrutiny may, 
in fact, cause harm, as Berger J.A. noted in White:  
News is a perishable commodity ... [and] unjustified delay in permitting 
full public access will have a deleterious effect on the ability of the 
media to report, and, in the result, for the public to be informed. 
Contemporaneous access to court documents and processes allows the 
media to fulfill their legitimate role as the eyes and ears of the public.140 
A further concern expressed by Deschamps J. also merits comment 
— her reference to delaying publication until “more complete informa-
tion produced in accordance with the standards applicable to criminal 
trials is available”.141 This too seems inconsistent with Toronto Star v. 
Ontario, where Fish J. confirmed the long line of jurisprudence that the 
openness principle applies to all stages of the criminal process.142 An 
Information to obtain a search warrant may be very one-sided, and will 
be reported and regarded that way. So too an investigative hearing. If all 
that occurs at a bail hearing is the reading of allegations by the Crown, or 
the presentation of untested hearsay, then at least the public will learn of 
                                                                                                             
136  Toronto Star v. Canada – CA, supra, note 56, at para. 82. 
137  Dagenais, supra, note 7, at para. 183: “Unlike news, immediacy is not the essence of 
docudramas.” (emphasis added), per Gonthier J., in dissent; Brown, supra, note 106, at para. 23, per 
Trafford J., citing David Lepofsky, Open Justice: The Constitutional Right to Attend and Speak 
About Criminal Proceedings (Toronto: Butterworths, 1985): “Immediacy is of fundamental 
importance to the constellation of principles of s. 2(b) of the Charter.”; Triple Five Corp v. United 
Western Communications Ltd., [1994] A.J. No. 278, at para. 6 (Alta. C.A.), per Kerans J.A.: “News, 
as the word implies, invokes something new — something fresh. As a result time for [the media] is 
always of the essence.”  
138  R. v. Domm, [1996] O.J. No. 4300, 31 O.R. (3d) 540, at para. 40 (Ont. C.A.). 
139  R. v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd., [2005] O.J. No. 5533, 204 C.C.C. (3d) 397, at para. 
33 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
140  White, supra, note 70, at para. 6. 
141  Toronto Star v. Canada – SCC, supra, note 11, at para. 39. 
142  Toronto Star v. Ontario, supra, note 1, at para. 31. 
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— and perhaps criticize — the process. But to suggest that reporting of 
judicial acts must be dependent on evidence admissible at trials, when 
those judicial acts are not so dependent, is inconsistent with MacIntyre 
and Toronto Star v. Ontario, and is troubling indeed. 
It should also be borne in mind that it is now simply not possible for 
courts to control the spread of information — prejudicial or not, true or 
false — over the Internet.143 Rumour and speculation can emanate from 
— or be fuelled by — official sources. Law enforcement officials often 
make public statements about accused persons and the allegations against 
them at the time of arrest. It is irrational that police sources should be 
able to make public statements — as occurred in Toronto Star v. Canada, 
namely, that the accused were “adherents of a violent ideology inspired 
by al-Qaeda” and that the arrests “prevented the assembly of any bombs 
and the attacks from being carried out” — yet the public is then pre-
vented from hearing these same allegations when they are raised (or not), 
and potentially tested (or not), in a court of law. As Rosenberg J.A. 
noted, the ban imposed by section 517 “has no effect on other pre-trial 
publicity, some of which may be more inflammatory than the general 
factual information presented at the bail hearing”.144 
Unlike police sources and individuals posting information on the 
Internet, news organizations have a duty to report fairly and accurately 
on court proceedings.145 They are also subject to contempt charges if they 
endanger fair trial interests. Newspapers and broadcasters act responsi-
bly. There are no instances in Canada in which pre-trial publicity has 
been found to have prejudiced a fair trial, or prevented the selection of an 
impartial jury. As the English Court of Appeal recently pointed out,  
                                                                                                             
143  Parliament appears to have sought to curtail the possibility of non-media sources publish-
ing what transpires at bail hearings by extending the reach of s. 517 to publication in “any 
document” instead of only applying to a newspaper or broadcast. This is presumably to address the 
concern identified in the McRuer Report of members of the public disseminating information from 
bail hearings. See An Act to amend the Criminal Code (protection of children and other vulnerable 
persons) and the Canada Evidence Act, S.C. 2005, c. 32, s. 17. This amendment does nothing, of 
course, to prevent rumour and speculation about criminal proceedings. 
144  Toronto Star v. Canada – CA, supra, note 56, at para. 95. And on the facts of the case 
before him he pointed out, at para. 81, that “there is no indication that what would be disclosed at the 
bail hearing would be any more prejudicial than information disclosed by the authorities at the time 
of the arrest”. 
145  Libel and Slander Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.12, s. 4(1); Young v. Toronto Star Newspapers 
Ltd., [2005] O.J. No. 4216, 77 O.R. (3d) 680, at paras. 92-98 (Ont. C.A.). 
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the responsibility for avoiding the publication of material which may 
prejudice the outcome of a trial rests fairly and squarely on those 
responsible for the publication. In our view, broadcasting authorities 
and newspaper editors should be trusted to fulfil their responsibilities 
accurately to inform the public of court proceedings, and to exercise 
sensible judgment about the publication of comment which may 
interfere with the administration of justice.146 
Thus, there is no basis to conclude that the public will form a fixed 
view of a matter as a result of a fair and accurate report on a bail hearing, 
any more so than it does from hearing the police assert at press confer-
ences that accused were planning a “terrorist attack”. Fair and accurate 
reports on court proceedings are an antidote to rumour and innuendo. 
They provide the public with legitimate information about judicial 
proceedings.  
XI. CONCLUSION 
Public confidence and public scrutiny go hand in hand. As McLach-
lin C.J.C. wrote in Hall, “[w]ithout public confidence, the bail system 
and the justice system generally stand compromised.”147 Yet, in light of 
Toronto Star v. Canada, section 517 prevents public understanding and 
scrutiny of what happens at bail hearings and how the grounds on which 
people are detained or released are applied by judges. It is difficult to 
have confidence in a process that is subject to such limited scrutiny. 
Whether the Supreme Court’s departure from its “unwavering decisions” 
on openness is an anomaly driven by concerns over fairness to an 
accused, or a harbinger of the things to come remains to be seen.  
                                                                                                             
146  R. v. B., supra, note 110, at para. 25 (emphasis added). See also R. v. Bhatti, [2006] All 
E.R. (Digest) 348 (C.A.). 
147  Hall, supra, note 131, at para. 31. 
